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PARTY AUTONOMY AND CONSUMER
ARBITRATION IN CONFLICT: A “TROJAN
HORSE” IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
THE E.U. ADR-DIRECTIVE 2013/11?
Norbert Reich†
ABSTRACT
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to controversy in many jurisdictions;
recent U.S. and Canadian Supreme Court case law have been used as examples. European
Union (E.U.) law, which originally excluded arbitration in general from the Brussels/Rome
regimes, has recently taken a mixed, and to some extent limited, approach by including
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) entities “imposing” a solution in its recent ADR
Directive 2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop consumer arbitration
schemes in E.U. Member States as a second route to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new
and somewhat clandestine policy of the E.U. The paper insists on some additional procedural
guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become more popular among Member countries,
even though Dir. 2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on “specific
acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such additional protection is in Article 47
of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, viewed together with Article 19(1) para. 2 of the
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) whereby “Member States shall “provide remedies
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. At the time of
writing, the implementation measures of Member States concerning Dir. 2013/11 have to be
awaited before making any final judgment as to their conformity with E.U. law and efficiency.
The paper seeks to provide some guidelines for this coming debate.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses an important new development in conflict
regulation between consumers and businesses in the E.U.—a subject
matter which has kept me busy for some time. This paper will address
the question of how a regime of extra-legal conflict management by
ADR mechanisms, which are based on voluntary cooperation between
consumers and traders, supplements, but does not replace, judicial
court proceedings. This paper argues that a more intrusive regime to
solve consumer complaints by binding arbitration will become
increasingly popular. Justice will be more or less privatized under an
efficiency rhetoric, which criticizes lengthy, costly, and highly
discretionary court proceedings that exist in many Member States to
the detriment of consumers and the working of justice in general. For
many legal scholars, binding arbitration based on contractual
agreements is regarded as an alternative; however, it is not always clear
what the legal and consumer policy costs of an extension of ADR
mechanisms are, and whether there is a fair balance between the
supposed efficiency gains on the one hand and the requirements of
effective legal protection on the other.
The paper will proceed as follows. First, it will give an overview
of liberal and mixed regimes concerning the promotion of binding
consumer arbitration, namely in the United States (Section I) and
Canada (Section II) where the legitimacy and limits of consumer
arbitration have been subject to controversial Supreme Court
judgments. These judgments show the complexity of this issue and
provide insight into future E.U. developments of ADR mechanisms in
E.U. countries. Section III will analyze new trends in E.U. law
provoked by the recently adopted ADR Directive 2013/11/EU,1

1
Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes 2013, 2014
O.J. (L 165/63) [hereinafter Directive 2013/11]. See Horst Eidenmüller & Martin
Engel, Die Schlichtungsfalle: Verbraucherrechtsdurchsetzung nach der ADR-Richtlinie und
ODR-Verordnung der EU, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1704 (2013) for a
critical appreciation of those who are not concerned with consumer arbitration
specifically, but who fear not without justification a de facto denial of justice to
consumers even if they take proceedings with a non-binding outcome; it is unrealistic
to expect consumers to pursue their claim if rejected by the ADR-entity before courts
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where consumer arbitration has found a place of its own in regulating
ADR-entities “imposing solutions” on consumers. Section IV
concerns the scope of application of Dir. 2013/11. Section V examines
prior E.U. law in the form of two important, and in the opinion of this
author, still valid precedents set by the Court of Justice of the E.U.
(CJEU, then called ECJ), namely Claro2 and Asturcom.3 Sections VI
through X propose some standards on valid consumer arbitration by
reference to Dir. 2013/11 and other E.U. law instruments. These
standards are then measured under a fundamental rights perspective
contained in Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19(1)(a) Treaty
of the European Union (TEU), namely the principle of effective
judicial protection of rights granted to consumers under E.U. law.4
Then, Section XI argues that these standards limit party-autonomy
with regard to binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and
require the adoption of additional mechanisms to curb an eventual
abuse of arbitration clauses by traders or trade associations. Finally,
Sections XII through XVII examine E.U. countries that must adapt
their arbitration legislation to new E.U. standards. Some preliminary
conclusions will follow.

of law. The authors also question the legal basis of Article 114 of the Directive,
although such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
2
Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R.
I-10421; see also Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 41.
3
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera,
2009 E.C.R. I-9579 ¶ 54-55. See Jules Stuyck, Note to Pannon and Asturcom, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 879 (2010); Christopher Hodges, Consumer Protection and
Procedural Justice, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF
JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyn Terryn et al. ed. 2013); Chantal Mak, Judgment of the Court
(First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez
Nogueira, Case C-40/08, Commentary, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 437 (2010); Martin
Ebers, ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones
SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law,
Ex Officio Application of European Union Law and Res Judicata 18 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L.
823 (2010). See also ALEXANDER J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, B2C ARBITRATION: CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN ARBITRATION 7, 117, 133 (2012).
4
See NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW ch. IV
(2014).
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A LIBERAL APPROACH: ADR IN THE UNITED STATES

In the words of the Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating,
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 “declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”6 U.S. law generally takes a very liberal view
toward arbitration clauses without making a distinction between
commercial and consumer arbitration.7 This view was confirmed in the
Court’s controversial decision of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph.8
In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, Larketta Randolph signed a
financing agreement for the purchase of a mobile home with Green
Tree Financial. The agreement bound any disputes arising from the
agreement to arbitration. When Randolf sued Green Tree for violating
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the district court compelled
arbitration. However, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit overturned the
district court’s decision, finding that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because the steep arbitration costs would negatively
affect Randolph’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. The Supreme
Court disagreed and held that consumers bear the burden to prove that
the arbitral forum is financially inaccessible to them.9 This opinion was
challenged by a strong dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer (in part), who argued that, “as a repeat player in the
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior
information about the costs to consumers of pursuing arbitration.”10
This approach by the Supreme Court means that ADR mechanisms in
favor of consumers can easily be avoided by arbitration clauses entered
into by standard form contracts with consumers as in Green Tree.
Recent state court cases, however, show a somewhat more
nuanced approach toward arbitration clauses. For example, Comb v.
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2014) [hereinafter FAA].
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
7
LARS WEIHE, DER SCHUTZ DER VERBRAUCHER IM RECHT DER
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 116, 205-06 (2005) (for a critique from a consumer
policy point of view with regard to “informed consent”).
8
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
9
Id. at 92.
10
Id. at 96.
5
6
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Paypal11 concerned a class action against an electronic disbursement
service alleging illegal removal of funds.12 The defendant, Paypal,
argued that the case should have been submitted to arbitration because
the contract contained an arbitration clause.13 The District Court held
that, despite its wide use and recognition in relevant California law, the
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable for several
reasons.14 First, there was a lack of mutuality whereby arbitration was
imposed on the weaker party while the stronger party was allowed the
choice of forum.15 Second, the clause contained a prohibition against
consolidation of claims.16 Third, the costs of arbitration and venue
were unconscionable because the “place or manner” in which
arbitration was to occur unreasonably took into account “the
respective circumstances of the parties.”17
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems18 concerned an action for false
advertising and deceptive business practices of the defendant
PacifiCare for inducing persons to subscribe to health plans. 19
PacifiCare claimed that the plaintiff, who obtained health coverage
through his employer, was required to arbitrate his claim because of
the subscriber agreement between PacifiCare and the plaintiff’s
employer.20 The California Supreme Court held that the arbitration
clause was unenforceable.21 The Court’s reasoning was similar to the
decision in Comb, at least insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, but
not with regard to restitution and unjust enrichment. Therefore, in
California, claims for unjust enrichment are arbitrable, while claims for
injunctions against deceptive advertising practices are not arbitrable
because they are undertaken “in the public benefit.”

Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1166.
13
Id. at 1169-70.
14
Id. at 1172.
15
Id. at 1173-75.
16
Id. at 1175-76.
17
Id. at 1177 (quoting Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888,
894-95 (Ct. App. 2001)).
18
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003).
19
Id. at 1159.
20
Id. at 1160.
21
See generally id.
11
12
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The Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing Corp. v. Cardegna
seemed unconcerned by attempts to limit the effects of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.22 The litigation in Cardegna concerned a
class action suit brought against usurious terms in a consumer credit
agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.23 The case was an
appeal from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court, which set aside
the arbitration clause.24 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful
“could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but
is criminal in nature . . .”25 The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia,
reversed the Florida Supreme Court and distinguished two causes in
which arbitration clauses can be challenged in court:
1) The arbitration clause is unlawful as such; and
2) The entire contract from which the arbitration
clause cannot be severed is invalid, which was not
the case in a usurious credit agreement.
The Supreme Court held that, “regardless of whether the challenge is
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must
go to the arbitrator.”26
Consumer protection depends on the willingness of arbitrators
to apply and enforce consumer protection provisions in particular of
state law. Arbitration awards, however, are not published, and
therefore are not subject to critical public and academic debate. It
seems that there is no remedy under U.S. law against an arbitration
award disregarding mandatory consumer protection provisions, unless
the consumer can prove the existence of the narrow defenses

22

See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440

23

Id. at 442-43.
Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla.

(2006).
24

2005).
Id. (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
26
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 449.
25
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enumerated in the 1958 New York Convention.27 Arbitration clauses
have become a prominent and popular instrument to avoid the
application of consumer protection provisions, at least in contract
litigation between business and consumers, and particularly in class
action suits.
An arbitration clause may be considered “substantially
unconscionable,” as in the Pennsylvania case of Bragg v. Linden
Research,28 if an arbitration clause is either one-sided or nontransparent, or if there are additional costs to the consumer to
arbitrate.
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed the
relationship between arbitration clauses in cellular telephone contracts
between respondents (the Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) and
the prohibition of classwide arbitration.29 After the Concepcions were
charged sales taxes on the retail value of phones provided free under
their service contract, they sued AT&T in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was
consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia, that AT&T had
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free
phones”. The Supreme Court in rejecting the consolidation claim took
the opposite view of the California Supreme Court,30 which had ruled
that consumers must have the right to proceed with a class action and
shall not be forced into arbitration. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, framed AT&T as a clash of two policies, namely, the policy
27
Defenses under the convention include: lack of proper notice,
arbitration decision contrary to public policy of the forum country, manifest
disregard of the law. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S.
3
[hereinafter
New
York
Convention],
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.ht
ml.
28
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF THE ONLINE WORLDS
95 (2010) for a discussion of U.S. practice on enforcing contractual provisions
containing an arbitration clause where the Bragg decision was found to be “rather
surprising (to many legal commentators) and presume that other courts looking at
the contracts of other virtual words will be more likely to find them enforceable.”.
29
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
30
Discover Bank v Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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of California courts favoring consumers’ decision to opt for class
actions, and the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. The Supreme
Court held that the FAA preempts the state court class action rule, so
the dispute must be submitted to arbitration and shall not proceed as
a class action.31 In his dissent, Justice Breyer insisted that, due to the
small amount of the individual claim ($30.22), a denial of class actions
practically means a denial of justice. This argument was rejected by the
majority, who reasoned that class actions in arbitration proceedings are
not useful and manageable remedies. As Justice Scalia said: “Requiring
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with
the FAA.”
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, decided by the Supreme
Court on June 20, 2013, concerned an arbitration clause that
disallowed anti-trust claims to be brought by a class.32 Again, the
Court’s majority reiterated its liberal view favoring arbitration as a
“matter of contract,” even against mandatory provisions of federal
anti-trust laws. Justice Kagan’s dissent, in my opinion, correctly insists
on the “effective vindication” rule established in prior case law, which
limits arbitration clauses where they effectively prevent enforcement
of “congressionally created rights.”33 This is accomplished by
arbitration clauses that de facto prevent compensation of anti-trust
claims and undermine the deterrent effect of compensation for antitrust infringements.
The case law of the Supreme Court limits effective consumer
protection as provided by federal (anti-trust) and state law (the
California Discover Bank rule34). The Court also seems to contradict
the plain meaning of section 2 of the FAA, which reads:
[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and

31
32
33
34

Id. at 1750-51.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
Id. at 2313.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100.
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
equity for the revocation of any contract.35
Therefore, the FAA would seem to allow limits to arbitration
in consumer (and commercial) matters based on defenses such as
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and mandatory (federal and/or state)
law, which was in part developed by state courts but had been regarded
with hostility by the Supreme Court majority. This practice creates, as
the dissent in American Express pointed out, areas of de facto
immunity from law: “[the FAA] reflects a federal policy favoring actual
arbitration—that is, arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of revolving
disputes,’ not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims.”36 However,
the Supreme Court’s message in American Express is unequivocal:
courts are required to enforce arbitration agreements, including class
action waivers, in accordance with their terms.
Legal practitioners and scholars have criticized the Supreme
Court’s liberal view on arbitration as an “excessive use” of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.37 The disadvantages of excessive use of
arbitration for consumers seem to outweigh the advantages of
arbitration for service and goods providers, namely:


no possibility of a rational decision for or against
arbitration before the dispute arises;

FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014).
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2315.
37
See WEIHE, supra note 8, at 43-45; Richard M. Alderman, The Future of
Consumer Law in the United States – Hello Arbitration, Bye-Bye Courts, So-Long Consumer
Protection (Univ. Hous. L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-A-09, 2007); Richard M.
Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1
(2003); Gerhard Wagner, Dispute Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice
Systems, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 347, 394 (Horst Eidenmüller ed. 2013). With regard to then existing
smalls claims procedures, see NORBERT REICH, STAATLICHE REGULIERUNG
ZWISCHEN MARKTVERSAGEN UND POLITIKVERSAGEN 129 (1988). See also GRALFPETER CALLIESS, GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRÄGE 308-14
(2006) (providing a critical view (without citing the harsh case law of the U.S.
Supreme Court)).
35
36
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the trader can always amend the arbitration clause
unilaterally;



no legal representation, no class actions, limited
possibilities for bringing evidence, no legal dispute
insurance;



arbitrators cannot be formally obliged to apply
state consumer protection legislation;38



only limited access to documents (which are
usually in the hand of the trader), no pre-trial
discovery procedure;



no jury, only limited appeal possibilities;



frequently excessive costs, compared with existing
small claims procedures; and



the place of arbitration may be geographically
distant from residence of consumer.
II.

4:1

A MIXED APPROACH: ADR IN CANADA

In terms of Canadian law on arbitration, a lively discussion
existed among scholars in Canada on whether pre-contractual
arbitration clauses could be enforced in consumer contracts, and
whether they could eventually be used to avoid class actions similar to
the United States.39

The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Due Process
Protocol contains such an obligation, while the rules of the ICC (International
Chamber of Commerce) are silent on that point. CALLIESS, supra note 39, at 359.
39
See Shelley McGill, The Conflict between Consumer Class Actions and
Contractual Arbitration Clauses, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 359 (2006); Jonnette Watson
Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL
L.J. 693 (2006). But see David T. Neave & Jennifer M. Spencer, Class Proceedings: The
New Way to Trump Mandatory Arbitration Clauses?, 63 THE ADVOCATE 495 (2005)
(favoring of the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, according to the
U.S. model which is said to strike the “right balance”).
38
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In Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, the Canadian
Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses in an electronic consumer
contract for the purchase of computers from a U.S. company by a
citizen of Quebec were also enforceable40 against a class action brought
by the Quebec “Union des consommateurs”. The Court reasoned that
the consumer had access to the arbitration clause via a hyperlink on
the website of the company, and that he agreed to be bound by the
clause when he clicked on the link.41 The Court also reasoned that “the
clause was no more difficult for the consumer to access than would
have been the case had he or she been given a paper copy of the entire
contract on which the terms and conditions of sale appeared on the
back of the first page.”42 Further, the Court stated that any challenge
to the arbitration agreement must be resolved first by the arbitrator
who has Kompetenz-Kompetenz under international agreements and
Canadian law.43 This doctrine is a traditional doctrine in (commercial)
arbitration under which the arbitrator, and not a court of law, has the
“competence-competence,” or the final say over the legality of
arbitration proceedings, including the choice of the arbitrator.44
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority, arguing that
the arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, which are, according the
Quebec law, forbidden, are similar if they refer the consumer case to a
non-Quebec authority. This is the case with the reference to the U.S.
arbitrator as foreseen in the contract clause; the arbitration clause is
therefore unenforceable.
A more recent case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court,
Seidel v. TELUS, seems to take a more critical view on arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts aimed at excluding class action
proceedings against the supplier of cellular telephone services.45 In
40

Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R.

801 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44 Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA,
1991 E.C.R. I-3855 (expressly finding that the arbitrator had this authority); see
Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln in Grenzüberschreitenden
Börsentermingeschäften, 12 Z. Eur. Pro. 981 (1996).
45 Seidel v. TELUS Commc'ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.); Shelley
McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51(2) CAN. BUS. L.J. 187 (2011).
41
42

301

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

Seidel, the contract contained a clause with the supplier referring
disputes to “private and confidential arbitration,” as well as a waiver
by the consumer of the right to pursue a class action claim.46 Among
the questions before the Supreme Court were whether this clause was
unconscionable under the British Columbia Business Practices and
Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA), and whether the waiver was in
conformity with section 3 of the BPCPA, which provides: “Any waiver
or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits or protections
under this Act is void except to the extent that the waiver or release is
expressly permitted by this Act.”47
One of the questions before the Court was whether this
prohibition had to be enforced by the arbitrator under the Canadian
(and U.S.) Kompetenz-Kompetenz rule, or whether it could also be
enforced by a court of law. The majority relied on section 172 of the
BPCPA, which allows any person without “a special interest” to bring
a class action for injunctive and declaratory relief.48 The plaintiff in
Seidel relied on this provision for her action against TELUS to avoid
the arbitration clause and class action waiver. In interpreting the scope
of section 172, the majority—against a strong dissenting opinion
defending traditional principles of arbitration law—relied on the
objective of the BPCPA, which is to confer consumer protection and
enhance consumers’ access to justice.49 This objective implicitly limits
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle at least with regard to declaratory and
injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court held that the class action waiver
was dependent on the (annulled) arbitration clause; it could not be
separated from it and could not exist without a valid arbitration
clause.50 The decision, however, made no reference to compensation
or restitution where section 172 (3) is applicable only to a much more
limited extent.

46
47

Id. ¶ 44.
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2

(Can.).
Id. § 172. The BPCPA also seems to contain broad standing provisions
not dependent on the violated rights.
49
Seidel, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531.
50
Id. ¶ 46.
48
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III. TO “PROPOSE” OR “IMPOSE” A SOLUTION: THE QUESTION OF
E.U. LAW
EU Dir. 2013/11 provides for a two-tier mechanism for the
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, which are described in
Art. 2(1):
This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-ofcourt resolution of domestic and cross-border disputes
concerning contractual obligations stemming from
sales contracts and service contracts between a trader
established in the Union and a consumer resident in
the Union through the intervention of an ADR-entity
which proposes or imposes a solution or brings the
parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable
solution.51
“Propose” and “impose” are nearly identical terms, so they
likely went nearly unnoticed in the (scant) debate of the Commission
proposal of 20 November 2011 on the Directive,52 which was adopted
in the record time of little more than one and a half years. Both
elements of the proposal and the final Directive were based on the
internal market provision of Article 11453 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The question of the
correct legal basis will be further discussed in Section XII.
However, to “propose” a solution is quite different than to
“impose” a solution. “Proposing” a solution is in line with the earlier
initiatives by the Commission, which were based on
Recommendations 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 and 2001/310/EC

Directive 2013/11, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
Commission Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, COM (2011) 793 final (Nov. 20, 2011).
53
Art. 114 (1) TFEU gives the European Union jurisdiction “to adopt
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment
or functioning of the internal market.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 114 (1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47
[hereinafter TFEU].
51
52
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of 4 April 2001.54 These Recommendations were not applicable to
entities who tried to “impose” a solution on consumers, e.g., binding
consumer arbitration. In contrast, arbitration, including consumer
arbitration, was expressly excluded from the scope of E.U. instruments
concerning jurisdiction (Art. 1(2)(d) Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 and
now Art. 1(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012.55 and applicable
law (Art. 1(2)(e) of the Rome I-Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008).56
These Regulations, however, were not based on the internal market
competence of the E.U., but on its provisions of judicial cooperation
in civil matters, which are limited to cross-border disputes under now
Art. 81(2) of the TFEU.57 The same is true of the Regulation (EC) No.
861/2007 of 11 July 2007 on a European Small Claims Procedure.58
Why this sudden extension of ADR procedures to consumer
arbitration? How does this extension relate to the seemingly
contradictory statement in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, which
reads: “This Directive acknowledges the competence of Member
States to determine whether ADR entities established on their
territories are to have power to impose a solution.”?59 An additional
reservation is made in Recital (20) whereby an “out-of-court procedure
which is created on an ad hoc basis for a single dispute between a
consumer and a trader should not be considered as an ADR
procedure.”60 This excludes the commercial practice of setting up

54
Commission Recommendation 98/257, of 30 March 1998 on the
Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of
Consumer Disputes 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31; Reich, supra note 1, ¶ 8.19, 8.22.
55
Commission Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and
the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1;
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
56
Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and the Council of
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome I”), 2008
O.J. (L 176) 6.
57
TFEU art. 81(2).
58
Council Regulation 861/2007, of 11 July 2007 on a European Small
Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1.
59
Directive 2013/11, art. 2(4).
60
Id. at Preamble Directive 20.
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special arbitration panels for more complex individual disputes as an
option for consumer arbitration falling under Directive 2013/11.
IV.
A FIRST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE CONUNDRUM ON
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CREATED BY DIRECTIVE 2013/11
Dir. 2013/11 shows a certain contradiction concerning
consumer arbitration: Member States are free to set it up, to continue
existing instruments, or to completely abstain from doing so. If,
however, Member States take an active view toward consumer
arbitration, they are bound by the requirements of Directive 2013/11
in general, and Articles 10 and 11 in particular, which will be discussed
in greater detail later in Sections VII and IX.
Article 10 and 11 only apply in cases where the plaintiff
consumer is bound by an arbitration agreement, not if the trader
himself initiates a claim in arbitration.61 According to Article 2(1) and
(2)(c) it is limited to actions in contract (with the exception of noneconomic services of general interest), and excludes actions in tort and
restitution with some doubts concerning borderline cases not to be
discussed here. Injunctions against illegal behavior of traders sought
by consumer associations are also excluded; they come under other
E.U. law instruments, in particular Directive 2009/22/EU on
injunctions.62
The principles contained in Directive 2013/11 are obviously
minimum requirements under Art. 2(3). Within these limits, Member
States are free to regulate consumer arbitration, e.g., regarding
competence, costs, choice of arbitrators, etc. This is part of Member
States’ so-called “procedural autonomy,” which has been recognized
by the CJEU as a general principle of E.U. law.63 On the other hand,
61
If the trader initiates a claim in arbitration, Directive 2013/11 is not
applicable. See Directive 2013/11, art. 2(2)(g).
62
Directive 2009/22, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (recast),
2009 O.J. (L 110) 30.
63
For an overview see REICH, supra note 5, ¶ 4.4; Norbert Reich, HansW. Micklitz, Peter Rott and Klaus Tonner, Negotiation and Adjudication – Class Actions
and Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW ¶ 8.3 (2d
ed. 2014).
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Member States must respect the principles of effectiveness and
equivalence, which are now part of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of
Fundamental Rights—a subject matter to be discussed in Section XI.
V.

THE LIMITS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION: CLARO AND
ASTURCOM

In Claro,64 the CJEU goes quite far in the degree to which the
national court of an E.U. Member State must engage in investigations
on its own motion in arbitration proceedings.65 When the consumer
has agreed to an arbitration clause—the unfairness of which must be
determined by national law, as could be seen from clause 1(q) of the
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/1366—the consumer still
cannot be drawn into arbitration against his will if this clause may be
regarded as unfair. Annex 1 reads:
Terms that may be regarded as unfair . . .
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy,
particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which,
according to the applicable law, should lie with another
party to the contract.67
The unfairness may also be invoked against traditional principle of the
law of arbitration on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator and not
the national court having jurisdiction to determine the unfairness.

64

Case C-168/05, E.M.M. Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R.

I-10421.
65
Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and the Sleeping Beauty –
The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 771
(2014).
66
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
67
Id.
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In Asturcom, the CJEU quite adroitly used the principle of
“equivalence” to guarantee a sort of “last resort” protection to the
consumer: if national law allows the reopening of arbitration
proceedings on the basis of public policy, the judge must consider the
defenses available under E.U. consumer protection provisions which
take the place of public policy.68 Advocate General Trstenjak, who is
in line with the Hungarian and the Spanish Governments69 as well as
the European Commission,70 went even further in arguing that
effective consumer protection requires the removal of res judicata in
execution proceedings.71
The facts in Claro and Asturcom are somewhat different, as the
consumer was drawn into arbitration proceedings by the trader that
contained arbitration clauses. Directive 2013/11 expressly excludes
this situation where the trader, not the consumer, takes his case to an
entity that administers ADR. However, it seems that the principles
developed in Claro and Asturcom can be generalized, especially
concerning their challenges to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine.
Such a situation could arise under Directive 2013/11 where the
consumer takes his complaint to a court of law, and the trader invokes
the arbitration clause as a defense72 to compel arbitration, provided the
arbitration clause meets the requirements of Article 10 after the
implementation of the Directive. The situation in Asturcom where a
final arbitration award against a consumer can be challenged only
under the limited requirements of the public policy (ordre public)
68
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecommunicaciones v. Rodrígues Noguera,
2009 E.C.R. I-9579. The extension of the public policy concept to “mere” mandatory
law has remained controversial in doctrine. See the skeptical remarks by Vanessa
Mak, Harmonisation through “Directive Related” Case Law: the Role of the ECJ in the
Development of European Consumer Law 136-37 (Tilburg Inst. of Comparative &
Transnational Law, Working Paper No. 2008/8, 2008); Mak, supra note 4, at 446. See
also BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 32 (insisting on the difference between “public
policy” and “public interest”: “consumer protection is associated with public interest;
it is not subject to public policy). This distinction between public interest and public
policy seems artificial and cannot be maintained under E.U. law autonomous
interpretation principles.
69
See Hungarian and Spanish Gov’t. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).
70
See European Com. Br. in Asturcom (on file with author).
71
Advocate Gen. Trstenjak in Asturcom, supra note 4, at 58 et seq.
72
“Schiedseinrede” in German. See Section XII, infra.
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provision must be reshaped under the effectiveness test and not merely
under the equivalence principle. This discussion illustrates that
Directive 2013/11 does not address the real problems of consumer
arbitration, and that the gaps left by E.U.-legislation must therefore be
amended by recourse to general principles of E.U. law, namely the
principle of effective legal protection.73
VI.

WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE
BRUSSELS MECHANISM OF JURISDICTION?

A consumer who wishes to have his claim against a trader
located in another E.U. country arbitrated cannot rely on the
jurisdiction of his home country, as would be the case under the
Brussels regime. Directive 2013/11 does not contain rules on
jurisdiction in cross-border conflicts, nor does it refer to the Brussels
regime in a similar way as Art. 11 to the consumer protective
provisions of Art. 6 of the Rome I-Regulation 593/2008 (see Section
IX, infra).
Art. 7(1)(a) only requires ADR-entities to “make publicly
available on their websites . . . clear and easily understandable
information on . . . their contact details, including postal address and
e-mail address.”74 This provision—including the submission of claims
online75—may be acceptable for optional complaint handling, but not
for arbitration which may “impose solutions” to consumers. The
impact of the risk to the consumer to lose his case is much more farreaching because of the binding nature of the (non-)award by the
arbitrator.
Article 15(1) lit c) of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (Article
17(1) lit c) Regulation 1215/2012) provides that the consumer may sue
the trader either at the trader’s place of domicile or at the business seat
if “the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that
For further discussion of the principle of effective legal protection, see
Section XI, infra.
74
Council Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(a).
75
Council Directive 2013/11, art. 5(2)(a).
73
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Member State or several States including that Member State.”76 There
has been intense debate concerning this provision due to the issues
raised by e-commerce, since the provision may be interpreted in such
a way that the mere accessibility of the website of a company situated
in one Member State by a consumer domiciled in another Member
State may give such consumer the right to sue the company in the
consumer’s domicile—a result which makes marketing by e-commerce
subject to different and divergent jurisdictions. Therefore, the CJEU
in Pammer distinguished between the mere accessibility of a website,
which does not qualify as “directing activities,” and a non-exclusive list
of criteria for determining “directing activities” where such a
qualification is possible and must be established by competent national
courts.77 The trader may avoid being subject to multiple jurisdictions
by making clear his intention to market his product or service only in
certain countries to the exclusion of others, or by not making available
his website in those excluded countries.
Jurisdiction clauses are regulated by Article 17 of Regulation
44/2001 resp. Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012.78 The rationale
behind this provision is that such clauses in consumer contracts cannot
be enforced before the litigation has commenced. A consumer does
not lose privileged access to courts under Articles 15 and 16 by the
jurisdiction clause.79 This is in contrast to the general rule in Article 23
(Article 25 of Regulation 1215/2012), which allows jurisdiction clauses
to be enforced if entered into in writing or by electronic means.80
However, Article 23 is not applicable to consumer arbitration.

Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
art. 15(1)(c), 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).
77
Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer et al. v. Reederei
Karl Schlüter et al., 2010 E.C.R. I-12527; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Grenzenloser
Verbraucherschutz?, in LIBER AMICORUM U. MAGNUS 449, 455 (2014) (interpreting
“direct activities” as “activity directed at a certain objective” (“Zielgerichtete Tätigkeit”)).
78
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).
79
Id. art. 15-16.
80
Id. art. 23; see also Case C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v
CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, [2015] W.L.R.(D) 222.
76
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The gap left by the—insufficient—provisions on consumer
arbitration in Directive 2013/11 must be filled by reference to the
general fairness standards as developed under Directive 93/13, which
will be discussed in Section IX. In my opinion, no difference should
be made whether the action is brought by the consumer or the trader,
or whether the two are joined in a single case.
VII.

THE “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE” OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT BY THE CONSUMER

The most important provision for consumer protection in
Directive 2013/11 follows the classical paradigm of the “informed EU
consumer.”81 Article 10 explicitly requires specific acceptance by the
consumer for arbitration clauses in consumer to business (C2B)
disputes, which may be extended by Member States both horizontally
to a business to consumer (B2C) conflict and vertically by imposing
additional requirements on this specific acceptance. Article 10 reads:
(1) Member States shall ensure that an agreement
between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints
to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it
was concluded before the dispute has materialised and
if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his
right to bring an action before the courts for the
settlement of the dispute.
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving a dispute by imposing a solution
the solution imposed may be binding on the parties
only if they were informed of its binding nature in
advance and specifically accepted this. Specific
acceptance by the trader is not required if national rules
provide that solution are binding on traders.82

See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 92 (2d
ed. 2013); HANS W. MICKLITZ ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW ¶ 1.35
(2d ed. 2013).
82
Directive 2013/11, art. 10.
81
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It seems as though the intention of the E.U.-legislator was to
exclude pre-dispute arbitration clauses, which are common in the
U.S.83 The wording of Art. 10(1) refers to a “dispute” having
“materialised.”84 Before that event, the clause would not be binding on
the consumer. Can the same strict interpretation of this concept of
non-binding be applied similar to Article 6 of the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCC) 93/13 where, according to
case law of the CJEU, the court must ex officio disapply the unfair
contract term?85 This will have to be decided by the CJEU, but such
analogy seems reasonable given the similarity of the formulation in
Article 6 of the UTCC and Directive 2013/11.
Under a strict literal construction of Article 10, there is no
“dispute” to be resolved before the conclusion of a contract. This is
only the case once consumer complaints arise during contract
execution. Consumer arbitration clauses therefore only operate once a
specific dispute has arisen between the trader and the consumer. Both
parties may have good reasons to take their conflict to arbitration, e.g.,
because of the speed or lower costs of getting a (binding) decision, but
the consumer should not be forced to do so before a “dispute has
materialised.”86
What does “specific acceptance” mean? Recital 4387 does not
provide an answer. A similar provision, however, is contained in
Article 8(2) of the Draft Regulation of a Common European Sales Law
(CESL), which requires an “explicit statement which is separate from
the statement indicating the agreement to conclude a contract.”88 This
statement may be concluded in electronic form, but the trader must
notify the consumer of its binding nature on a durable medium, e.g., a

According to BĚLOHLÁVEK, supra note 4, at 385, this was not the case
with EU law before Dir. 2013/11.
84
Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1).
85
See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66 at 780.
86
Directive 2013/11, art. 10(1).
87
Recital 43 of the Preamble to Directive 2013/11.
88
Comission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
mof the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, art. 8(2),
(Oct. 22, 2011); Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Commission Proposal for a
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Too Broad or not Broad Enough? 29
(LAW, EUI Working Papers No. 4, 2012).
83
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mere hyperlink would not be enough.89 On the other hand, the
statement must be clearly separated from the contract terms, even if it
is contained in a “term not . . . individually negotiated” according to
Article 3(2) of Directive 93/13.90 A mere button solution, or so called
“click-wrap clauses,”91 which are popular in U.S. licensing agreements,
are not acceptable in E.U. law, which in Article 10(2) of Directive
2013/11 has set a minimum standard not to be undermined by
Member States’ law.
“Specific acceptance” has imposed an E.U. standard, subject
to CJEU’s interpretation. However, under Guy Denuit, an arbitration
panel or ADR-entity authorized to “impose” solutions cannot make
reference to the CJEU under Article 267 of the TFEU.92 This
paradoxical result warrants a critical assessment of the traditional rule
of (commercial) arbitration that the arbitrator, not the court, has
Kompetenz-Kompetenz concerning the validity of the arbitration
agreement, at least in consumer matters, to be scrutinized under
fundamental rights aspects later discussed in Section XII.
Since the requirements for “specific acceptance” in Article 3(2)
of Directive 2013/11 are minimal, Member States can increase these
requirements, e.g., by requiring written form or signature requirements,
or can limit the scope of arbitration clauses, e.g., by prohibiting them
for certain risky financial transactions93 or imposing a financial cap on

89
Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd. v. Bundesarbeitskammer, 2011
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 660 (Feb. 3, 2011).
90
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, art. 3(2) 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
91
Click-wrap clauses are defined as “another form of creating an
electronic agreement, except that the license is included on the computer screen
before installation rather than on the box. By clicking on a button that says “I agree”
or “I accept,” the licensee agrees to the terms of use of the contract. An important
difference between click-wrap agreements and shrink-wrap agreements is the fact
that the user actually has an opportunity to read the contract before using or installing
the program.” See Reich, A ‘Trojan Horse’ in the access to Justice? – Party Autonomy and
cOnusmer Arbitration in Conflict in the ADR-Directive 2013/11/EU? supra note 1, and
now Case C-322/14 Jaoud El Majdoub v CarsOntheWeb.Deutschland GmbH,
[2015] W.L.R.(D) 222..
92
Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit et al v. Transorient voyages et Culture SA
2005 E.C.R. I-925.
93
This was done in Germany. See the discussion infra Section XII.
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their use.94 Member States can also introduce rules on territorial or
local jurisdiction, which are not precluded by the Brussels regime not
applicable to arbitration.
VIII.

E.U. STANDARDS BEYOND “SPECIFIC ACCEPTANCE”

The above-mentioned Claro and Asturcom cases did not
concern the validity of the arbitration agreement, but left this issue to
applicable Member States. This will change once Directive 2013/11 is
implemented by Member States into their national law, which should
occur by July 9, 2015. Can E.U. unfair terms legislation be applied
beyond the mere information model95 of Directive 2013/11? Would a
national court be required to control ex officio under the unfairness test
arbitration clauses, which impose substantial inconveniences on the
consumer since arbitration is likely to result in excessive costs or will
force the consumer to take the case to an ADR-entity far away from
his residence (similar to the Bragg case)? It is well-known that E.U. law
is strict in banning jurisdiction clauses which force the consumer to
take his case to a court away from his habitual residence resulting in a
de facto denial of access to justice.96 On the other hand, the trader may
have an efficiency interest to concentrate arbitration proceedings at his
place of business.
Article 3(1)97 is not clear on how a possible relationship
between Directive 2013/11 and Directive 93/13 can be reconciled.
The provision is only concerned with “conflicts,” not with additional
requirements imposed by national law under the minimum protection
clause,98 even if based on CJEU practice obliging Member States’
courts to control ex officio the fairness of pre-formulated contract terms.
If the “specific acceptance” is contained in such a pre-formulated (yet
separate) term, it is therefore subject to the ex officio control doctrine of
the CJEU. Much will depend on the circumstances of the arbitration
This was done by the U.K. See the discussion infra Section XV.
See Reich et al, supra note 65, ¶ 1.11.
96 See Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. V. Ferenc Schneider 2010
E.C.R. I-847; Wulf-Henning Roth, Case 137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lizing Zrt v Ferenc
Schneider,7 Eur. Rev. Contract L. 425 (2011); Micklitz & Reich, supra note 66, at 789.
97
See Directive 2013/11.
98 Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, art. 8 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
94
95
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agreement. The main issue will always be whether the agreement makes
the enforcement of consumer rights easier and less burdensome, which
is the very objective of Directive 2013/11 under Article 1. In other
words, the issue is whether such agreement puts additional constraints
on the consumer’s enforcement of his rights under E.U. and national
law that contradict the fairness criteria of Article 3 of Directive 93/13.
It cannot be presumed that Article 3(1) Directive 2013/11 intended to
preclude the unfairness test as a general standard of E.U. civil law.
An open question remains as to how cross-border arbitration
clauses can be controlled under the unfairness concept. As a general
rule, arbitration is exempted from the applicability of Regulation
44/2001, Article 1(2) lit d). On the other hand, the effect of jurisdiction
clauses in consumer contracts has been severely limited by the
Regulation. Should these principles be applied per analogiam under the
unfairness standard to arbitration clauses, which may have a similar
effect on the consumer’s right to have his case heard in his home
jurisdiction if the conditions of Article 17 of Regulation 44/2001(in
the future: Article 19 Regulation 1215/2012) are met? There is indeed
no reason to argue against such analogy because, for the consumer, it
does not make any difference whether the denial of his home
jurisdiction before litigation is effected through a jurisdiction or
arbitration clause.99 The exemption of arbitration from the scope of
application of the Brussels instruments is intended to privilege
commercial arbitration, but not to deprive the consumer of his right
to a defense and a fair hearing. This reasoning limits the use of
arbitration clauses in cross-border contracting.
IX.

APPLICABLE LAW: (LIMITED) FREE CHOICE BY ARBITRATORS
OR RESERVATION OF MANDATORY PROVISIONS?

Under traditional arbitration law, in particular in commercial
matters, the parties are free to determine the applicable law, including
commercial usages or principles of equity. Article 7(1)(i) of the
Directive 2013/11 put this problem under the heading of
“transparency” for all ADR entities, including consumer arbitration:

99

Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1, at 45.
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Member States shall ensure that ADR entities make
publicly available on their websites, on a durable
medium . . ., and by any other means they consider
appropriate, clear and easily understandable
information on . . . the types of rules the ADR entity
may use as a basis for the dispute resolution (for
example legal provisions, considerations of equity,
codes of conduct).100
In addition, Article 6(1)(a) provides that the arbitrator need not
be a lawyer or a person trained in law, but should at least have a
“general understanding of law.”101 These are minimum standards,
which can be enhanced by Member State laws on consumer
arbitration, e.g., by restricting the reference to equity or codes of
conduct or by demanding that arbitrators have legal training. The
application of mandatory provisions of consumer law is regulated by
provisions on “legality” in Article 11. Article 11 concerns two
situations: (a) purely internal situations where mandatory consumer
law provisions must be applied, even if parties expressly opted out in
the contract; and (b) cross-border disputes where the rules on
applicable law in Regulation 593/2008102 are normally excluded for
arbitration agreements. Article 11 (1)(a)-(b) provides:
Member States shall ensure that in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a
solution on the consumer: (a) in a situation where there
is no conflict of laws, the solution imposed shall not
result in the consumer being deprived of the protection
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of
the Member State where the consumer and the trader
are habitually resident, (b) in a situation involving
conflict of laws, where the law applicable to the sales
or service contract is determined in accordance with
Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008,
the solution imposed by the ADR entity shall not result
Directive 2013/11, art. 7(1)(i).
Id. art. 6(1)(a).
102
Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (providing
regulations on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)).
100
101
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in the consumer being deprived of the protection
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of
the Member State in which he is habitually resident.103
This provision will be welcomed by E.U. lawyers if compared
with the traditional arbitration principles contained in U.S. law where
the arbitrator can be exempted from applying mandatory provisions,
and where legality control is only possible in final recognition
proceedings under a narrow ordre public and related concepts.104
Although the CJEU has tried to extend this concept to mandatory E.U.
law both in commercial105 and consumer106 disputes, case law has
remained unsettled and may not cover the entire scope of mandatory
E.U. consumer law. It also comes late after the entire arbitration
proceedings have been terminated, and it requires additional activity
(and costs!) by the consumer.
In my opinion, the legality requirement of consumer
arbitration can only be fulfilled if Member States grant a remedy to the
consumer to challenge an incorrect application of mandatory
provisions by the arbitrator. The following situations may arise:
 The consumer (or a group of consumers) brings a claim
against the trader before a court of law, but the trader
falsely invokes the arbitration agreement (the so-called
Schiedseinrede).
 The claim of the consumer is rejected (or reduced) by the
arbitrator based on a false application of mandatory
consumer law against Article 11 of Directive 2013/11; the
consumer wants to challenge this rejection before a court
of law, which may be impossible under existing arbitration
legislation.

Citation to the quoted provision.
See discussion of U.S. law supra Section I.
105
See Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l N.V.,
1999 E.C.R. I-3055.
106
See Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomm. v. Rodrígues Noguera, 2009
E.C.R. I-9579.
103
104
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In practice, the most frequent situation is concerned with the
trader—particularly in a long-term contract—using the arbitration
mechanism to adjudicate his claims, as in Claro and Asturcom. These
situations, however, are not covered by Directive 2013/11.
A fundamental rights analysis will help to resolve these
situations to avoid the fact that arbitration clauses are sometimes
abused, as in the U.S., by traders to restrict consumers’ access to class
claims for their individual claims. Section XI will provide a further
discussion of the fundamental rights analysis.
X.

“SOFT” LEGAL PROTECTION

Article 8 of Directive 2013/11 also contains some protective
provisions. However, Article 8 does not have the force of law, and
instead provides standards for good ADR practice subject to the
monitoring and reporting requirements in Article 20:
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a
nominal fee for consumers, lit (c); and
the outcome of the ADR procedure is made available
within a period of ninety calendar days from the date
of which the ADR entity received the complete
complaint file. In the case of highly complex disputes,
the ADR entity in charge may, at its own discretion,
extend the ninety calendar day time period. The parties
shall be informed of any extension of that period and
of the expected length of time that will be needed for
the conclusion of the dispute.107
These standards are standards flexible formulations applicable
to consumer arbitration. Member States have discretion as to whether
and how they implement them. Article 20 contains basic rules for
sound ADR systems as an alternative to going to court and provide for
inexpensive and quick adjudication. If practice in one Member State
shows that this objective cannot be obtained by the existing consumer
arbitration mechanism, it would be unfair to force the consumer to
107

Directive 2013/11, art. 20.
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refer his claims to such arbitration even if the standards of “specific
acceptance” under Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 are met. Of
course, the requirements in Article 20 can be used as recommendations
on how to interpret Member State law implementing E.U. law under
the Grimaldi doctrine.108
XI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: DIRECTIVE 2013/11
ARTICLE 47 CHARTER

The constitutional dimension of ADR proceedings has been
expressly included in Recital 61 of Directive 2013/11, which reads:
“[t]his Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and specifically Articles 7, 8, 38 and 47
thereof.”
Recital 45 refers to Article 47 concerning access to courts of
law—a principle reiterated in Article 12(1) of Directive 2013/11.109
This conforms to Alassini, which concerns a requirement in Italian law
for consumer complaints against telecommunication operators to first
make use of ADR/ODR proceedings, as foreseen in Directive
2002/22,110 before going to court.111 The Court discussed this
requirement, considering both the equivalence and the effectiveness
principle, but did not find a violation of either principle. At the same
time, the CJEU insisted on the consumer’s right to take his case to
court:
Nor do the principles of equivalence and effectiveness or the
principle of effective judicial protection preclude national legislation
which imposes, in respect of such disputes, prior implementation of
an out-of-court settlement procedure, provided that that procedure
does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it
does not cause a substantial delay for the purposes of bringing legal
108 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989
E.C.R. I-4497. This case involves the indirect relevance of Commission
recommendations in interpreting E.U. or national law.
109
Id. at recital 45, art. 12(1).
110 Directive 2002/22, Universal Service Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51
(EC).
111
Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia, 2009 E.C.R. I-2214.
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proceedings, that it suspends the period for the time-barring of claims
and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs
– for the parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by
which the settlement procedure may be accessed and interim measures
are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of the situation so
requires.112
Alassini concerned ADR proceedings, which could only
“propose,” not “impose,” solutions on the consumer. The wording of
the decision, however, certainly shows hostility against ADR
proceedings resulting in unreviewable and binding decisions. This
wording—even though not discussed in detail in the judgment itself—
is inconsistent with the traditional principles of arbitration under the
New York Convention, namely that the arbitrator has the KompetenzKompetenz to decide whether he has adjudicatory authority over the
case, and that an award can usually only be refused recognition on the
very narrow ground of “public policy (ordre public),” excluding the nonobservance of mandatory rules of procedure or substantive consumer
protection.
Can these traditional principles of arbitration law be upheld
under the rules of consumer arbitration as provided by Directive
2013/11, particularly Articles 10 and 11? I do not think so. This
directive is also concerned with a specific aspect of the
constitutionalization of civil law, namely, the principle of effectiveness
of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter, which provides: “[e]veryone whose
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance
with the conditions laid down in this Article.”113
Article 19(1) of the TEU puts the responsibility for “providing
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law” on Member States through the status of their
courts of law as “Union courts.”114 The agreement to arbitrate, as a
private matter decided by parties, cannot waive the constitutional
Id. ¶ 67.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, Dec.
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
114
Treaty on the European Union, Dec. 7, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1
[hereinafter TEU].
112
113
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requirements of effective legal protection by access to national courts
of law. The remedies, which are provided indirectly by arbitration
concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, do not suffice to
fulfill these constitutional requirements of E.U. law. The consumer
must always have the possibility to challenge a decision of the
arbitrator even if he has in principle agreed to the arbitration
proceedings by respecting Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11 or an
equivalent national provision. Agreement by “specific acceptance”
does not mean a total preclusion of the right to effective legal
protection, which the national judge must guarantee under the ex-officio
doctrine. Under the “remedial function” of Article 47 of the E.U.
Charter and Article 19(1)(2) of the TEU,115 Member States must
establish remedies protecting the legitimate interests of the consumer
that ensure that the mandatory requirements of consumer arbitration
are met.116 The freedom of Member States to regulate consumer
arbitration under Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11 should be limited
by the fundamental rights protected by E.U. law. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that:
 The validity of an arbitration agreement both from a formal
and a substantive view is ultimately a matter to be decided
by courts, not the arbitrator.
 In consumer arbitration, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz belongs to
the competent court, not the arbitrator.
 Decisions of the arbitrator to reject or limit a claim of the
consumer under Directive 2013/11 can be challenged
before courts of law, in particular in case of breach or nonobservance of mandatory provisions.
 The national judge hearing a case involving consumer
arbitration must ex officio apply the mandatory provisions of
E.U. and national law, even if not raised by the consumer.

See REICH, supra note 5, at 4-10.
Id. (this seems to be recognized by the Court in Claro and Asturcom,
even though not based on Article 47 of the E.U. Charter or Article 19 of the TEU,
which were not in force at the time of decisions, but rather the traditional principles
of effectiveness and equivalence).
115
116
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 The scope of Article 47 of the E.U. Charter and Article
19(1)(2) of the TEU is not limited to arbitration under
Directive 2013/11, but can be extended to any consumer
arbitration, in particular in cases brought by the trader
against the consumer before an arbitrator (B2C—the
Claro/Asturcom situations).
XII.

IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2013/11 ON MEMBER STATE LAW ON
CONSUMER ARBITRATION IN GERMANY

The German law on arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts117 begins with a “form model” of consumer protection.118
Sections 1029 and 1031 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, Code on Civil
Procedure), as amended in 1997, allow arbitration clauses if they have
been documented sufficiently well. Arbitration agreements which
involve consumers “must be contained in a document signed by the
parties themselves.”119 The signature of an agent is not enough.120 The
written form can be substituted by the electronic form according to
Section 126a of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB, Civil Code), as
amended.121 The written or electronic document may not contain any
other contractual clauses. Germany has not made any reservation
under the New York Convention of 1958 to exclude consumer
contracts. Therefore, the legal regime for arbitration in Germany is the

117
See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI
CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 73
(2012) (explaining the German “arbitration” system, but is more concerned with
conciliation and mediation (Schlichtung in German), not with binding arbitration as
understood here); Norbert Reich, Consumer ADR in Europe: Civil Justice Systems, 50
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 913 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR,
& NAOMI CREUTZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS (2012)).
118
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 155-58.
119
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan.
30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1031(5) (Ger.)
[hereinafter ZPO].
120
Id.
121
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 126a (Ger.).
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same whether or not a consumer is part of an arbitration agreement
meeting the form requirements.122
The provision in Section 1031(5) of the ZPO is similar to
Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/11,123 although the latter does not
require signature or an electronic equivalent. However, Article 2(3) of
Directive 2013/11 allows Member States to impose more stringent
provisions on consumer arbitration,124 including a requirement that the
document should only contain clauses concerning the arbitration
agreement as such. German law does not use the term “specific
acceptance,” but it seems that this is exactly what is meant by the
German legislature in an E.U.-conforming interpretation. It is obvious
that the arbitration agreement must be separated from other contract
clauses; however, there is no prior notification requirement which
must be included in the arbitration document.
Concerning the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, German
law contains a compromise solution somewhat different from
Directive 2013/11. Under Section 1032(1) of the ZPO, the arbitration
agreement precludes any action before a court of law (Schiedseinrede in
German), unless it is “void, ineffective or inoperative” (nichtig,
unwirksam oder undurchführbar).125 However, this “Schiedseinrede” must
be expressly raised by the defendant before oral proceedings in court.
This provision is not in line with the case law of the CJEU, which
requires an ex officio intervention of the court who does not have to
wait for an action of the consumer.126
On the other hand, Section 37h of the WpHG
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, law on securities transactions), as amended,
restricts arbitration clauses concluded before litigation to persons
acting in commerce (“Kaufleute”) and legal persons of public law, thus
excluding consumer transactions in investment services from

122
Jürgen Samtleben, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei
grenzüberschreitenden Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES
PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 974, 975 (1999) (Ger.).
123
ZPO, § 1031(5).
124
Directive 2013/11, art. 2(3).
125
ZPO, ¶ 1032(1).
126
REICH, supra note 5, ¶¶ 4, 16.
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arbitration clauses.127 Its legislative rationale is controversial128 and
beyond the scope of this paper. According to an earlier opinion of
Samtleben,129 the WpHG’s international sphere of application is
determined by the normal place of residence of the private investor. If
the place of residence is Germany, the arbitration clause is not
effective, and the consumer will be able to take his claim to the courts
of his country of residence according to Articles 15 and 16 of
Regulation 44/2001 (Article 17 and 18 of Regulation 1215/2012). The
arbitration clause prohibition contained in Section 37h of the WpHG
is consistent with the general power of Member States to regulate
consumer arbitration in Article 2(4) of Directive 2013/11, including
prohibiting it with regard to certain transactions (investment services).
This prohibition is also enforceable against a foreign arbitration
agreement, which need not be respected by the German judex a quo
under the provision concerning the application of “overriding
mandatory provisions” under Article 9 of Rome I-Reg.130
This rather liberal and generous approach to arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts (with the exception of investment services)
taken by the ZPO was confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH) with regard to the admissibility arbitration clauses under the
special legislation on unfair contract terms, now included in the
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Law on Securities Transactions],
Sep. 9, 1998, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 1842, as amended, § 37h (Ger.).
128
For different views on German legal literature, see Rolf Sethe, § 37h
WpHG (Schiedsabreden), in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) ¶ 7, (Heinz-Dieter
Assmann & Uwe H.Schneider eds., 6th ed. 2012) (examining “excessive investor
protection”); Rainer Hausmann, Schiedsvereinbaraungen, in INTERNATIONALES
VERTRAGSRECHT ¶ 3469 (Christoph Reithmann & Dieter Martiny eds., 7th Ed.
2014); Jürgen Samtleben, Das Börsentermingeschäft ist tot – es lebe das Finanztermingeschäft?,
15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 69, 76 (2003) (taking a more neutral
approach). Compare WEIHE, supra note 8, at 141 (arguing that § 37h WpHG expresses
a general principle of consumer protection), with Klaus Peter Berger,
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Finanztermingeschäfte – Der “Schutz” der Anleger vor der
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit durch § 37h WpHG, 15 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Börsenrecht 77,
85 (2003) (taking a more liberal approach). The author agrees with Weihe because of
the particular risks of transactions for the consumer covered by this provision, which
may not be adequately addressed by the arbitrator.
129
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 77.
130
See generally Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies
(Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4306
(Oct. 17, 2013) (interpreting Rome I-Reg).
127
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BGB.131 According to the BGH, an arbitration clause cannot impose
an unfair disadvantage on the consumer.132 The consumer is protected
by the form requirement of Section 1031(5) of the ZPO, which should
warn him against the risk of an arbitration clause.133 It is, in the opinion
of the BGH, not necessary that the user of the arbitration clause shows
a special interest in it. Unlike jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts may be concluded before the dispute arises. The
BGH also refers to Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the Annex of
Directive 93/13,134 where arbitration clauses are only condemned if
they concern disputes taken to arbitration “not covered by legal
provisions;” the rules of the ZPO, in the opinion of the BGH, must
be regarded as such provisions.135 The BGH also insists that the
arbitration clause regulates access to arbitration in a fair and impartial
manner.136
Even if in the case before the BGH the arbitration clause may
not have been unfair (the litigation concerned disputes involving losses
out of a speculative investment scheme of about 125.000 euro), the
judgment should not be generalized as allowing arbitration clauses in
any type of consumer dispute if the mere form requirements of Section
1031(5) of the ZPO are met. This is particularly true if the costs of
arbitration are substantial in relation to the sum in litigation and
amount to a de facto denial of justice. The same is true with regard to
the choice of the arbitrator, which gives an unfair advantage to one
party against the consumer.137 These questions will now have to be
measured against the requirements set up in Articles 10 and 11 of
Directive 2013/11 in the interpretation advanced in this paper (supra
VII/VIII). The BGH may have to reconsider its liberal opinion
towards arbitration clauses in future cases.

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 10, 2005,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 1125, 2005 (Ger.); WEIHE, supra note 8,
at 278.
132
See id.
133
WEIHE, supra note 8, at 187 (regarding existing German practices).
134
Id. at 1127.
135
Id. at 1127.
136
Id.
137
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLGDü) [Higher Regional Court of
Düsseldorf] June 1, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT [NJW] 400, 1996
(Ger.).
131
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THE SPANISH APPROACH

As Claro shows, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may
be declared void by Member States according to the so-called
indicative list,138 even though there is no formal obligation to do so.139
This has been done in Spain. However, arbitration clauses in preformulated consumer contracts are always possible where the dispute
is referred to “arbitration bodies established by statutory provision in
respect of a specific sector or circumstances.”140 Spanish Law has
established a “Sistema Arbitral de Consumo” in Article 31 of the
Consumer Protection Law of 1984, implemented by the Real Decreto
636/1993, modified by Decreto 60/2003.141 It provides for arbitration
panels (colegio arbitral) to be established by national and regional
“Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo.”142 These panels are composed of a
President (representing the competent administration), a consumer
representative, and a business association representative. Hence,
Spanish law prioritizes certain recognized consumer arbitration
bodies143 to which the arbitrator “agreed to” by Ms. Claro in her
dispute with a mobile telephone company did not belong.
The Spanish system was modified by Real Decreto 231/2008,
which defines the functions, composition, competences, and
procedures of consumer arbitration boards.144 The use of the
arbitration system is voluntary for the parties. First, an arbitration
138
Council Directive 93/13, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts, Annex 1 lit. q, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
139
See Case C-478/99, Comm’n v. Sweden 2002 E.C.R. I-4147 ¶ 20.
140
See Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Martime Agencies (Unamar) NV
v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4306 (Oct. 17,
2013).
141
See MANUEL-ANGEL LOPEZ SANCHEZ ET AL., SERVICIOS
FINANCIEROS, PROTECCION DEL CONSUMIDOR Y SISTEMAS EXTRAJUDICIALES DE
RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS IN ESPAÑA 119-170 (1995); see also WEIHE, supra note
8, at 119; Cavier Favre-Bulle, Arbitrage et règlement alternatif des litiges (ADR): une autre
justice pour les consommateurs?, in DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, LIBER AMICORUM
BERND STAUDER 95, 113 (2006).
142
LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, supra note 142, at 142-48.
143
See Ewoud Hondius, Towards a European Small Claims Procedure?, in
LIBER AMICORUM BERND STAUDER, 135 fn 36 (Luc Thévenoz & Norbert Reich,
eds. 2006).
144
HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 213.
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request form must be filled out by a consumer, his lawyer, or a
consumer association. This form requirement conforms to Article
10(2) of Directive 2013/11. Usually the arbitration board correlates to
the consumer’s residence. The use of arbitration is free of charge for
both consumers and businesses, with the exception of discovery, and
procedures usually do not take longer than six months. As with a court
judgment, the parties can appeal an arbitration decision within two
months. In addition, appeals can be brought based on decisions by the
Junta Arbitral del Consumo to accept or reject requests for arbitration
of consumer disputes. As an overall principle, Spanish law does not
recognize the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitrator, and therefore is
consistent with the approach advanced in this paper based on Article
47 of the E.U. Charter and Article 19 of the TEU.
The Spanish consumer arbitration system has created a second
tier of legal protection for consumers and is similar to a court system,
including the necessary guarantees of legality and effective legal
protection. It could serve as a model for other E.U. countries wanting
to implement the consumer arbitration provisions of Directive
2013/11 in a way suggested in this paper.
XIV.

A REGULATED APPROACH: FRANCE

According to French law, an arbitration clause (clause
compromissoire) in a consumer contract is invalid and cannot be enforced
against the consumer. This is derived from Article 2061 of the French
Civil Code, modified by Law of 15.5.2001, whereby “la clause
compromissoire est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une
activité professionelle.”145 However, in cross-border transactions
Article 2061 is not applicable, so the French Cour de Cassation146 has
taken a more liberal approach. French scholars criticize this approach
as “paradoxale” because the consumer enjoys less protection in crossborder relations even though such relations are more dangerous.
French scholars also refer to legislation on unfair contract terms,
HENRI TEMPLE & JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, DROIT DE LA
¶ 497 (9th ed., 2015) (“the arbitration clause is valid in a contract
concluded because of a professional activity”).
146
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Jan. 5, 1999, Bull. Civ. I, no. 31 (Fr.).
145

CONSOMMATION
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namely to the above mentioned Point 1(q) of the indicative list of the
Annex of Directive 93/13; this is interpreted as a blacklist, even though
the French legislature formally did not go so far.147 This argument,
however, was not considered by the ECJ in Claro.148
It unclear whether and how French law will be modified in
implementing Directive 2013/11. However, the prohibition of the
arbitration clause in B2C contracts can be maintained according to
Article 2(4) of Directive. 2013/11 since “[t]his Directive acknowledges
the competence of Member States to determine whether ADR entities
established on their territories are to have the power to impose a
solution.”
XV.

A COMPROMISE: U.K. LAW

U.K. law takes a nuanced approach to arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. The Arbitration Acts of 1996 permit only a
limited right of appeal from an arbitrator’s decision to courts of law.149
In particular, clauses binding consumers in advance to arbitration for
sums less than £5,000 are not allowed.150 The original provision under
the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act of 1988 exempted “non
domestic arbitration agreements” from the requirements of this rule;
however, the Court of Appeal extended it to consumers from other
E.C. countries to avoid a discrimination based on nationality.151
Arbitration has been frequently included in Codes of Practice
as a low cost dispute resolution scheme, but abuses of arbitration led
to the 1996 Spanish arbitration law amendments, which imposed a cap
on pre-formulated arbitration clauses. Therefore, ombudsmen

TEMPLE & CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 146, at 72.
See generally Reich, More clarity after “Claro”?, supra note 1.
149
GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW ¶ 14.7.1 (2d ed. 2005).
150 Id. ¶ 13.9.5.2. (iv).
151 Norbert Reich, Zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsklauseln bei grenzüberschreitenden
Börsentermingeschäften, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 981, ¶
14.6 (1998) (Ger.).
147
148
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schemes152 are preferred because they are binding only on businesses
and not on consumers.153
The Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) has initiated
a separate arbitration scheme,154 which is administered by CEDRsolve.155 The arbitrator’s award is issued in writing and provides a
summary of the facts, conclusions, and reasons for the decision. The
arbitrator’s decision is legally binding on both parties and is
enforceable directly through the courts. Any party can ask for a review
of the arbitrator’s decision, on paying a non-reimbursable £ 350 review
fee, although there are limited grounds on which this can be
challenged.156
XVI.

STATE MONITORED ADR SYSTEMS WITHOUT BINDING
ARBITRATION: SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Most Scandinavian countries have taken a specific approach
concerning the handling of consumer disputes, namely, by instituting
state complaint boards in which business and consumer associations
participate. This makes arbitration an out-of-court instrument of
dispute settlement more or less superfluous.
The institution of the Danish consumer complaint boards157
may serve as a model. Article 8(3) of the Danish Lov om
Forbrugerklagenoevnet of 1974/1988158 provides for a priority of
proceedings before the complaint board—even if the matter is already
in arbitration—if the consumer wants to take his complaint before the
board. The consumer can take his complaint before the board at any
An ombudsman scheme is a voluntary ADR system set up by the
industry and approved by the government.
153
Howells & Weatherill, supra note 150, ¶ 14.6.
154
See HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 328.
155
Dispute
Resolution
Services,
CEDR,
http://www.cedr.com/solve/dispute-resolution-services/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
156
HODGES ET AL., supra note 118, at 331.
157 Danish consumer complaint boards have been analyzed in detail by
Jens M. Scherpe, Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegung, in VERBRAUCHERSACHEN (2002); the
German translation of the law is at pages 285-289.
158 Art. 8(3) Lov om Forbrugerklagenævnet (Lovebehendtgoerelse Nr. 282
of 10.5.1988) (Den.).
152
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time during the complaint proceedings; there is no time limit or other
formal requirement. In this case, the arbitration proceedings will be
staid until the board has handled the matter. This rule implies that
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are not void as such, but also
do not preempt proceedings before the complaint board and thus
avoid the limited remedies for the consumer against arbitration clauses
in the above-mentioned “Einredesituation” under Article II(3) of the
New York Convention of 1958 as a defense against an arbitration
clause.
A similar situation in Sweden concerning the Allmänna
Reklamtionsnämnden (ARM) has been described in some detail in a study
by this author on financial regulation in the E.U.159 As a result of the
procedure, the ARM issues a written proposal for the settlement
(beslut), which in most cases will be accepted by the parties. If the
parties do not agree, they can take the case to court.
The Scandinavian system is said to work well both in the
interests of consumers and of business. It avoids lengthy court
proceedings and reaches a high rate of successful settlements.
XVII.

A SEEMINGLY UNKNOWN EXPERIENCE: POLAND

Poland has established—mostly before becoming member of
the E.U. in 2004—a detailed arbitration system. Nevertheless, if we
consider a recent paper of Polish scholar Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska,
“the awareness of [the arbitration system’s] existence still reaches very
few consumers.”160 There is a general scheme that “imposes” solutions
upon traders and consumers alike. This scheme, which is administered
by the State Trade Inspection, which has general jurisdiction in all
consumer matters except those which are specifically excluded and
must be submitted to specialized institutions. These excluded
consumer matters are:

INSTITUTIONELLE
FINANZMARKTAUFSICHT
UND
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (INSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION) 165 (Keßler, Micklitz, Reich eds. 2010).
160
Kinga Flaga-Gieruszynska, The Model of Consumer Arbitration Courts in
Poland, INT. J. ON CONSUMER L. & PRAC., 28, 39 (2013).
159
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 Permanent arbitration courts with the President of the
Office of Electronic Communications concerning claims
against telecom and postal operators.
 The Arbitration Court at the Insurance Ombudsman
handling disputes concerning insurance contracts and
occupational pension schemes.
 Consumer Banking Arbitration at the Polish Banking
Association (the Banking Arbitrator) whose decisions are
binding on banks, but not on consumers.
There is no obligation for consumers to take their disputes to
arbitration, unless a binding agreement has been concluded. This is
determined by the general provisions of the Polish Civil Code (Article
385(1), which has implemented the E.U. Directive 93/13 on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts.161 As Flaga-Gieruszynska writes:
Thus, the status of consumer arbitration courts is
determined on the one hand by the decision making
act of a public authority . . . which is a unique situation
with regard to arbitration, and on the other hand—the
act of will of the parties, which is the foundation of the
creation of arbitration courts (the arbitration clause).
Without the latter, it is impossible to speak of the
existence of forms of dispute resolution of a voluntary
nature.162
CONCLUSIONS
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been subject to
controversy in many jurisdictions. U.S. law has strongly favored
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Even among law and
economics scholars there is no disagreement that “indeed arbitration
restricts access to lawsuits and recovery”. This is justified by law and
economics scholarship because “it removes the disproportionate
benefit (to the ‘sophisticated elite’) and thus eliminates a regressive
161
162

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
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cross-subsidy.”163 It remains however an open question whether this
supposed redistributive effect suffices to impose binding arbitration
clauses on consumers. In my opinion this is not the case because denial
of individual access to justice cannot be justified be overall efficiency
arguments.
As the overview of the law on consumer arbitration clauses in
some (not all!) E.U. Member countries has shown, the situation is quite
different; one may call it even rather “chaotic”. It ranges from a simple
prohibition of such clauses (France) to their permission under certain
procedural (Germany, Spain, Poland) or substantive limitations (UK),
to state monitored ADR systems (Scandinavian countries) which are
not formally binding on the consumer but have similar effects in
practice.
Directive 2013/11, if implemented by Member State legislation
before 9 July 2015 (which does not seem to be the case anyhow!), has
not brought about any consistent E.U. practice, unlike the U.S. Federal
Arbitration Act. Following a more “access to justice” approach, E.U.
law has taken a mixed and to some extent limited approach in including
ADR entities that “impose” a solution in its recent ADR Directive
2013/11. There seems to be an indirect encouragement to develop
consumer arbitration schemes in Member States as a second route of
access to justice. It is too early to evaluate this new and somewhat
clandestine policy of the E.U.
This paper therefore has insisted on some additional
procedural guarantees should consumer arbitration schemes become
more popular among E.U. Member countries, even though Directive
2013/11 already contains some “minimum protection” provisions on
“specific acceptance” and applicable law. The basic reference for such
additional protection seems to be Article 47 of the E.U. Charter of
Fundamental Rights in conjunction with Article 19(1) paragraph 2 of
the TEU whereby Member States must “provide remedies sufficient
to ensure effective legal protection” of E.U. consumers.164 At the time
of writing, Member States must wait to implement measures
Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Court: Economic Analysis, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 447,
458 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).
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concerning Directive 2013/11 and to make any final judgments as to
their E.U.-law conformity and efficiency. This paper sought to provide
some guidelines for this upcoming debate.
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